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Diffstat (limited to 'gnupg/gpg.conf')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnupg/gpg.conf | 35 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnupg/gpg.conf b/gnupg/gpg.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b40b3f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnupg/gpg.conf @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ + +###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### +utf8-strings +keyserver hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net +keyserver-options ca-cert-file=~/.config/gnupg/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem +keyserver-options no-honor-keyserver-url +auto-key-locate local,pka,keyserver +keyserver-options honor-pka-record,auto-key-retrieve +verify-options show-keyserver-urls,pka-lookups +###+++--- GPGConf ---+++### Tue 14 Jan 2014 09:55:23 AM CET +# GPGConf edited this configuration file. +# It will disable options before this marked block, but it will +# never change anything below these lines. +default-key 3A9D0BB5 +homedir ~/.config/gnupg +display-charset utf-8 +armor +use-agent +encrypt-to 3A9D0BB5 +personal-digest-preferences SHA512 + +# when outputting certificates, view user IDs distinctly from keys: +fixed-list-mode +# short-keyids are trivially spoofed; it's easy to create a long-keyid collision; if you care about strong key identifiers, you always want to see the fingerprint: +keyid-format 0xlong +#with-fingerprint +# when multiple digests are supported by all recipients, choose the strongest one: +personal-digest-preferences SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224 +# preferences chosen for new keys should prioritize stronger algorithms: +default-preference-list SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224 AES256 AES192 AES CAST5 BZIP2 ZLIB ZIP Uncompressed +# You should always know at a glance which User IDs gpg thinks are legitimately bound to the keys in your keyring: +verify-options show-uid-validity +list-options show-uid-validity +# when making an OpenPGP certification, use a stronger digest than the default SHA1: +cert-digest-algo SHA512 |