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Diffstat (limited to 'features/step_definitions/tor.rb')
| -rw-r--r-- | features/step_definitions/tor.rb | 402 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 402 deletions
diff --git a/features/step_definitions/tor.rb b/features/step_definitions/tor.rb deleted file mode 100644 index ac12fd4c..00000000 --- a/features/step_definitions/tor.rb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,402 +0,0 @@ -def iptables_chains_parse(iptables, table = "filter", &block) - assert(block_given?) - cmd = "#{iptables}-save -c -t #{table} | iptables-xml" - xml_str = $vm.execute_successfully(cmd).stdout - rexml = REXML::Document.new(xml_str) - rexml.get_elements('iptables-rules/table/chain').each do |element| - yield( - element.attribute('name').to_s, - element.attribute('policy').to_s, - element.get_elements('rule') - ) - end -end - -def ip4tables_chains(table = "filter", &block) - iptables_chains_parse('iptables', table, &block) -end - -def ip6tables_chains(table = "filter", &block) - iptables_chains_parse('ip6tables', table, &block) -end - -def iptables_rules_parse(iptables, chain, table) - iptables_chains_parse(iptables, table) do |name, _, rules| - return rules if name == chain - end - return nil -end - -def iptables_rules(chain, table = "filter") - iptables_rules_parse("iptables", chain, table) -end - -def ip6tables_rules(chain, table = "filter") - iptables_rules_parse("ip6tables", chain, table) -end - -def ip4tables_packet_counter_sum(filters = {}) - pkts = 0 - ip4tables_chains do |name, _, rules| - next if filters[:tables] && not(filters[:tables].include?(name)) - rules.each do |rule| - next if filters[:uid] && not(rule.elements["conditions/owner/uid-owner[text()=#{filters[:uid]}]"]) - pkts += rule.attribute('packet-count').to_s.to_i - end - end - return pkts -end - -def try_xml_element_text(element, xpath, default = nil) - node = element.elements[xpath] - (node.nil? or not(node.has_text?)) ? default : node.text -end - -Then /^the firewall's policy is to (.+) all IPv4 traffic$/ do |expected_policy| - expected_policy.upcase! - ip4tables_chains do |name, policy, _| - if ["INPUT", "FORWARD", "OUTPUT"].include?(name) - assert_equal(expected_policy, policy, - "Chain #{name} has unexpected policy #{policy}") - end - end -end - -Then /^the firewall is configured to only allow the (.+) users? to connect directly to the Internet over IPv4$/ do |users_str| - users = users_str.split(/, | and /) - expected_uids = Set.new - users.each do |user| - expected_uids << $vm.execute_successfully("id -u #{user}").stdout.to_i - end - allowed_output = iptables_rules("OUTPUT").find_all do |rule| - out_iface = rule.elements['conditions/match/o'] - is_maybe_accepted = rule.get_elements('actions/*').find do |action| - not(["DROP", "REJECT", "LOG"].include?(action.name)) - end - is_maybe_accepted && - ( - # nil => match all interfaces according to iptables-xml - out_iface.nil? || - ((out_iface.text == 'lo') == (out_iface.attribute('invert').to_s == '1')) - ) - end - uids = Set.new - allowed_output.each do |rule| - rule.elements.each('actions/*') do |action| - destination = try_xml_element_text(rule, "conditions/match/d") - if action.name == "ACCEPT" - # nil == 0.0.0.0/0 according to iptables-xml - assert(destination == '0.0.0.0/0' || destination.nil?, - "The following rule has an unexpected destination:\n" + - rule.to_s) - state_cond = try_xml_element_text(rule, "conditions/state/state") - next if state_cond == "RELATED,ESTABLISHED" - assert_not_nil(rule.elements['conditions/owner/uid-owner']) - rule.elements.each('conditions/owner/uid-owner') do |owner| - uid = owner.text.to_i - uids << uid - assert(expected_uids.include?(uid), - "The following rule allows uid #{uid} to access the " + - "network, but we only expect uids #{expected_uids.to_a} " + - "(#{users_str}) to have such access:\n#{rule.to_s}") - end - elsif action.name == "call" && action.elements[1].name == "lan" - lan_subnets = ["10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"] - assert(lan_subnets.include?(destination), - "The following lan-targeted rule's destination is " + - "#{destination} which may not be a private subnet:\n" + - rule.to_s) - else - raise "Unexpected iptables OUTPUT chain rule:\n#{rule.to_s}" - end - end - end - uids_not_found = expected_uids - uids - assert(uids_not_found.empty?, - "Couldn't find rules allowing uids #{uids_not_found.to_a.to_s} " \ - "access to the network") -end - -Then /^the firewall's NAT rules only redirect traffic for Tor's TransPort and DNSPort$/ do - loopback_address = "127.0.0.1/32" - tor_onion_addr_space = "127.192.0.0/10" - tor_trans_port = "9040" - dns_port = "53" - tor_dns_port = "5353" - ip4tables_chains('nat') do |name, _, rules| - if name == "OUTPUT" - good_rules = rules.find_all do |rule| - redirect = rule.get_elements('actions/*').all? do |action| - action.name == "REDIRECT" - end - destination = try_xml_element_text(rule, "conditions/match/d") - redir_port = try_xml_element_text(rule, "actions/REDIRECT/to-ports") - redirected_to_trans_port = redir_port == tor_trans_port - udp_destination_port = try_xml_element_text(rule, "conditions/udp/dport") - dns_redirected_to_tor_dns_port = (udp_destination_port == dns_port) && - (redir_port == tor_dns_port) - redirect && - ( - (destination == tor_onion_addr_space && redirected_to_trans_port) || - (destination == loopback_address && dns_redirected_to_tor_dns_port) - ) - end - bad_rules = rules - good_rules - assert(bad_rules.empty?, - "The NAT table's OUTPUT chain contains some unexpected " + - "rules:\n#{bad_rules}") - else - assert(rules.empty?, - "The NAT table contains unexpected rules for the #{name} " + - "chain:\n#{rules}") - end - end -end - -Then /^the firewall is configured to block all external IPv6 traffic$/ do - ip6_loopback = '::1/128' - expected_policy = "DROP" - ip6tables_chains do |name, policy, rules| - assert_equal(expected_policy, policy, - "The IPv6 #{name} chain has policy #{policy} but we " \ - "expected #{expected_policy}") - good_rules = rules.find_all do |rule| - ["DROP", "REJECT", "LOG"].any? do |target| - rule.elements["actions/#{target}"] - end \ - || - ["s", "d"].all? do |x| - try_xml_element_text(rule, "conditions/match/#{x}") == ip6_loopback - end - end - bad_rules = rules - good_rules - assert(bad_rules.empty?, - "The IPv6 table's #{name} chain contains some unexpected rules:\n" + - (bad_rules.map { |r| r.to_s }).join("\n")) - end -end - -def firewall_has_dropped_packet_to?(proto, host, port) - regex = "^Dropped outbound packet: .* " - regex += "DST=#{Regexp.escape(host)} .* " - regex += "PROTO=#{Regexp.escape(proto)} " - regex += ".* DPT=#{port} " if port - $vm.execute("journalctl --dmesg --output=cat | grep -qP '#{regex}'").success? -end - -When /^I open an untorified (TCP|UDP|ICMP) connections to (\S*)(?: on port (\d+))? that is expected to fail$/ do |proto, host, port| - assert(!firewall_has_dropped_packet_to?(proto, host, port), - "A #{proto} packet to #{host}" + - (port.nil? ? "" : ":#{port}") + - " has already been dropped by the firewall") - @conn_proto = proto - @conn_host = host - @conn_port = port - case proto - when "TCP" - assert_not_nil(port) - cmd = "echo | netcat #{host} #{port}" - user = LIVE_USER - when "UDP" - assert_not_nil(port) - cmd = "echo | netcat -u #{host} #{port}" - user = LIVE_USER - when "ICMP" - cmd = "ping -c 5 #{host}" - user = 'root' - end - @conn_res = $vm.execute(cmd, :user => user) -end - -Then /^the untorified connection fails$/ do - case @conn_proto - when "TCP" - expected_in_stderr = "Connection refused" - conn_failed = !@conn_res.success? && - @conn_res.stderr.chomp.end_with?(expected_in_stderr) - when "UDP", "ICMP" - conn_failed = !@conn_res.success? - end - assert(conn_failed, - "The untorified #{@conn_proto} connection didn't fail as expected:\n" + - @conn_res.to_s) -end - -Then /^the untorified connection is logged as dropped by the firewall$/ do - assert(firewall_has_dropped_packet_to?(@conn_proto, @conn_host, @conn_port), - "No #{@conn_proto} packet to #{@conn_host}" + - (@conn_port.nil? ? "" : ":#{@conn_port}") + - " was dropped by the firewall") -end - -When /^the system DNS is(?: still)? using the local DNS resolver$/ do - resolvconf = $vm.file_content("/etc/resolv.conf") - bad_lines = resolvconf.split("\n").find_all do |line| - !line.start_with?("#") && !/^nameserver\s+127\.0\.0\.1$/.match(line) - end - assert_empty(bad_lines, - "The following bad lines were found in /etc/resolv.conf:\n" + - bad_lines.join("\n")) -end - -def stream_isolation_info(application) - case application - when "htpdate" - { - :grep_monitor_expr => '/curl\>', - :socksport => 9062 - } - when "tails-security-check", "tails-upgrade-frontend-wrapper" - # We only grep connections with ESTABLISHED state since `perl` - # is also used by monkeysphere's validation agent, which LISTENs - { - :grep_monitor_expr => '\<ESTABLISHED\>.\+/perl\>', - :socksport => 9062 - } - when "Tor Browser" - { - :grep_monitor_expr => '/firefox\>', - :socksport => 9150 - } - when "Gobby" - { - :grep_monitor_expr => '/gobby\>', - :socksport => 9050 - } - when "SSH" - { - :grep_monitor_expr => '/\(connect-proxy\|ssh\)\>', - :socksport => 9050 - } - when "whois" - { - :grep_monitor_expr => '/whois\>', - :socksport => 9050 - } - else - raise "Unknown application '#{application}' for the stream isolation tests" - end -end - -When /^I monitor the network connections of (.*)$/ do |application| - @process_monitor_log = "/tmp/netstat.log" - info = stream_isolation_info(application) - $vm.spawn("while true; do " + - " netstat -taupen | grep \"#{info[:grep_monitor_expr]}\"; " + - " sleep 0.1; " + - "done > #{@process_monitor_log}") -end - -Then /^I see that (.+) is properly stream isolated$/ do |application| - expected_port = stream_isolation_info(application)[:socksport] - assert_not_nil(@process_monitor_log) - log_lines = $vm.file_content(@process_monitor_log).split("\n") - assert(log_lines.size > 0, - "Couldn't see any connection made by #{application} so " \ - "something is wrong") - log_lines.each do |line| - addr_port = line.split(/\s+/)[4] - assert_equal("127.0.0.1:#{expected_port}", addr_port, - "#{application} should use SocksPort #{expected_port} but " \ - "was seen connecting to #{addr_port}") - end -end - -And /^I re-run tails-security-check$/ do - $vm.execute_successfully("tails-security-check", :user => LIVE_USER) -end - -And /^I re-run htpdate$/ do - $vm.execute_successfully("service htpdate stop && " \ - "rm -f /var/run/htpdate/* && " \ - "systemctl --no-block start htpdate.service") - step "the time has synced" -end - -And /^I re-run tails-upgrade-frontend-wrapper$/ do - $vm.execute_successfully("tails-upgrade-frontend-wrapper", :user => LIVE_USER) -end - -When /^I connect Gobby to "([^"]+)"$/ do |host| - @screen.wait("GobbyWindow.png", 30) - @screen.wait("GobbyWelcomePrompt.png", 10) - @screen.click("GnomeCloseButton.png") - @screen.wait("GobbyWindow.png", 10) - # This indicates that Gobby has finished initializing itself - # (generating DH parameters, etc.) -- before, the UI is not responsive - # and our CTRL-t is lost. - @screen.wait("GobbyFailedToShareDocuments.png", 30) - @screen.type("t", Sikuli::KeyModifier.CTRL) - @screen.wait("GobbyConnectPrompt.png", 10) - @screen.type(host + Sikuli::Key.ENTER) - @screen.wait("GobbyConnectionComplete.png", 60) -end - -When /^the Tor Launcher autostarts$/ do - @screen.wait('TorLauncherWindow.png', 60) -end - -When /^I configure some (\w+) pluggable transports in Tor Launcher$/ do |bridge_type| - bridge_type.downcase! - bridge_type.capitalize! - begin - @bridges = $config["Tor"]["Transports"][bridge_type] - assert_not_nil(@bridges) - assert(!@bridges.empty?) - rescue NoMethodError, Test::Unit::AssertionFailedError - raise( -<<EOF -It seems no '#{bridge_type}' pluggable transports are defined in your local configuration file (#{LOCAL_CONFIG_FILE}). See wiki/src/contribute/release_process/test/usage.mdwn for the format. -EOF -) - end - @bridge_hosts = [] - for bridge in @bridges do - @bridge_hosts << bridge["ipv4_address"] - end - - @screen.wait_and_click('TorLauncherConfigureButton.png', 10) - @screen.wait('TorLauncherBridgePrompt.png', 10) - @screen.wait_and_click('TorLauncherYesRadioOption.png', 10) - @screen.wait_and_click('TorLauncherNextButton.png', 10) - @screen.wait_and_click('TorLauncherBridgeList.png', 10) - for bridge in @bridges do - bridge_line = bridge_type.downcase + " " + - bridge["ipv4_address"] + ":" + - bridge["ipv4_port"].to_s - bridge_line += " " + bridge["fingerprint"].to_s if bridge["fingerprint"] - bridge_line += " " + bridge["extra"].to_s if bridge["extra"] - @screen.type(bridge_line + Sikuli::Key.ENTER) - end - @screen.wait_and_click('TorLauncherNextButton.png', 10) - @screen.hide_cursor - @screen.wait_and_click('TorLauncherFinishButton.png', 10) - @screen.wait('TorLauncherConnectingWindow.png', 10) - @screen.waitVanish('TorLauncherConnectingWindow.png', 120) -end - -When /^all Internet traffic has only flowed through the configured pluggable transports$/ do - assert_not_nil(@bridge_hosts, "No bridges has been configured via the " + - "'I configure some ... bridges in Tor Launcher' step") - leaks = FirewallLeakCheck.new(@sniffer.pcap_file, - :accepted_hosts => @bridge_hosts) - leaks.assert_no_leaks -end - -Then /^the Tor binary is configured to use the expected Tor authorities$/ do - tor_auths = Set.new - tor_binary_orport_strings = $vm.execute_successfully( - "strings /usr/bin/tor | grep -E 'orport=[0-9]+'").stdout.chomp.split("\n") - tor_binary_orport_strings.each do |potential_auth_string| - auth_regex = /^\S+ orport=\d+( bridge)?( no-v2)?( v3ident=[A-Z0-9]{40})? ([0-9\.]+):\d+( [A-Z0-9]{4}){10}$/ - m = auth_regex.match(potential_auth_string) - if m - auth_ipv4_addr = m[4] - tor_auths << auth_ipv4_addr - end - end - expected_tor_auths = Set.new(TOR_AUTHORITIES) - assert_equal(expected_tor_auths, tor_auths, - "The Tor binary does not have the expected Tor authorities " + - "configured") -end |